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TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
INFORMATION SECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION: MASS MEDIA AND THE POLITICS OF
IDENTITY
Comment and Translation by Douglas Carman
Abstract: The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation was
one of the first policy documents issued by President Vladimir Putin's Security Council.
The Doctrine, ostensibly drafted as a security policy document, was severely criticized by
the Russian press and civil libertarians for its undue attention to the mass media and the
prominence of politicized symbols of identity. The document extends the conventions of
security policy discourse into the domain of information, thus legitimizing state
intervention in the production of social knowledge. The Doctrine's textual representation
of threat, or "discourse of danger," delimits the boundaries of national identity and
legitimizes the exercise of control over the principal agent of the cultural production-the
mass media. Employing identity politics in the service of a "strong state," the Kremlin
has intensified its regulation of the communications infrastructure to ensure the
uniformity and stability of the nation's locus of meaning. This translation provides
selected sections of the Doctrine to reveal the discursive strategies employed to
legitimatize the role of the state in the reproduction of identity, and the accompanying
analysis seeks to demonstrate the Kremlin's active performance of this role by subsuming
"independent" television under the charge of the state.
I . INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, with its constituent republics
breaking up into fifteen independent, sovereign states. At that moment, the
Russian Federation came into being as a nation for the first time in history,
assuming the legacy of the administrative and ideological center of a failed
empire.' A decade of constitutional reforms have led to disappointing
results, as the abuse of power on both federal and regional levels has eroded
1 "Russia," in fact, has never existed as a nation-state. Robert Sharlett, Development of the
Democratic Institutions and Rule of Law in the Former Soviet Union: Reinventing the Russian State:
Problems of Constitutional Implementation, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 775 (1995). Under the tsars, the
Russian Empire was merely an extension of the monarchy's territorial ambitions, with the word "Russia"
representing more of a philosophical-spiritual concept than a nation with distinct geographical
boundaries. See generally NICOLAS BERDIAEV, THE RUSSIAN IDEA (1948). Deposing the tsarist regime,
the Bolsheviks created the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic as one of the constituent republics
of the Soviet Union. Though commonly perceived as the metropole of an empire subject to near absolute
control from the center, many see the period of history from 1917-1991 as a time when Russia was
"occupied" by the Communist Party. See generally ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, "RussKIt VOPROS" K
KONTSU XX VEKA [THE RUSSIAN QUESTION AT THE END OF THE XX CENTURY] (1995).
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peoples' confidence in democracy. Economic growth in Russia has been
consistently poor, and it has become clear that the transition to a free market
economy will require a drastic transformation in business management and
culture. Moreover, society has lost even the affects and symbols of its
national identity, which makes the systemic problems mentioned more
difficult to endure, and inhibits the capacity of the people to reach a common
unity of purpose.
It is in this context that Vladimir Putin, a relative outsider to the
Kremlin, ascended to the presidency of the Russian Federation. Though
little was known about his agenda as presidential candidate,' Putin was
elected in March 2000, thanks in large part to an expertly crafted media
campaign. 3 After only a few months in office, Putin's principal strategy for
promoting Russia's recovery became clear: to rebuild a "strong state."'4
Presumably, this policy objective would precipitate an improvement of the
federal government's capacity to fulfill its basic functions and help foster the
development of a unified state in the service of its citizenry. 5 In addition to
2 Putin refused to participate in any televised debates during the presidential campaign, and did not
produce any campaign commercials to explain his platform. Michael Gordon, Putin Running
"Uncampaign" On the Way To Election, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at A9.
3 Predicting a Putin victory, David Remnick suggested that the presidential campaign was over
before it even began. David Remnick, The Black Box: Vladimir Putin may be Russia's Next President, but
Who's Really in Charge? NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 40. Boris Berezovsky, one of Russia's new
"oligarchs" (a small circle of industrialists, bankers, and government officials who became rich following
the collapse of the Union by snatching up state properties at criminally low prices) had a number of media
holdings, most importantly a controlling interest in ORT, the largest state television network. Id.
Berezovsky orchestrated a propaganda campaign for Putin that dominated the airwaves for a three-month
period leading up to the election. Id. In an interview at a time when the polls predicted an overwhelming
victory for Putin, Berezovsky said, "For me, mass media is a political instrument, but, now that politics
have been decided, we're not moving backward. Mass media will be good business." Id. at 42. Berezovsky
subsequently fell into disfavor with Putin when, reacting against Putin's crusade to dethrone the
"oligarchs," he began to speak out against the Kremlin. Berezovsky was then investigated for financial
improprieties, accused of supporting Chechen terrorists, and demonized for his political opportunism.
(When he was being investigated for financial improprieties, he decried the implications as politically
motivated and an attempt to stifle his right to free speech.) He was forced to relinquish his shares in ORT
to his partner Roman Abramovich. Abramovich promptly submitted to the Kremlin, allowing it to appoint
all eleven members of the channel's board. Valeriia Sycheva, ORT Bez Berezovskogo [ORT Without
Berezovsky], SEGODNIA, Jan. 11, 2001. Berezovsky is now in exile.
Stephen Hanson, Putin and the Dilemmas of Russia's Anti-Revolutionary Revolution, 307
CURRENT HISTORY 333 (2001). See also M. Steven Fish, Putin 's Path, JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, Oct.
2001, at 72. "Putin's political project stands on four pillars: centralizing state power, formulating a
practical ideology, restoring state control of communication, and structuring political competition." Id.
Fish elaborates by indicating that, "[r]ecentralizing state power is the centerpiece of the Putin agenda." Id.
5 As a means to an end, the centralization of authority may serve to neutralize destabilizing forces
that threaten the very existence of a country. For example, some claim that "central authoritarianism is
better than regional authoritarianism," because a strong federal government can keep authoritarian local
rulers in check. Recentralization in Center-Periphery Relations, EASTWEST INSTITUTE-RUSSIAN
REGIONAL REPORT 23, June 19, 2001. In Putin's Russia, centralization of political authority is being
achieved by administrative means, such as the appointment of representatives of the executive branch to
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sound policies and practices, realizing state priorities depends in large part
on the ability of the government to formulate and exercise authority with a
sense of conviction and resolve with which its citizenry can identify.
6
Vladimir Putin, wishing to solicit a national unity of purpose, has engaged in
the exercise of discursive power to this end.
Historically, states that have brutishly manipulated ideological
discourse to generate an enduring consensus and a consistent social identity
have perished. The decay of the Soviet state ideological apparatus8 and
subsequent collapse of the Union is clearly the most relevant example. The
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") found that methods of
constructing social knowledge, such as the criminalization of dissent9 or the
censorship of ideologically unacceptable ideas, 10  were susceptible to
subversion and ultimately proved destructive. Incorporating the collective
will of a diverse, multiethnic nation-state into coherent policy demands
genuine consensus.11 To ensure the legitimacy of state authority, the
seven newly created federal districts. See generally Gordon M. Hahn, 10 EAST EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (2000). The establishment of the post of govemor-general was intended to
strengthen the vertical system of power and to rein in Russia's more independently minded governors and
regional legislatures. Id.
6 Jurgen Habermas argues that a nation needs "an idea that (is] vivid and powerful enough to shape
people's convictions and appeal more strongly to their hearts and minds than the dry ideas of popular
sovereignty and human rights." Jurgen Habermas, The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of
Sovereignty and Citizenship, in THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 118, 105-28
(Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiffeds., 1998).
Speaking to chief editors of the mass media, Putin said that "'[w]hen we talk about the unity of the
Russian state, we should not forget that unity begins with words, from the formulation of the idea of unity,'
and the media bears responsibility for promoting that." Putin Says He'sfor a Free Press, But..., RFE/RL
NEWSLINE SECURITY WATCH, at http://www.rferl.org/securitywatch/2001/01/3-220101.html (Jan. 22,
2001).
8 Reality and relative values are represented in the ideological state apparatus, whose material form
exists in institutions such as the political system, the family, the law, and the system of mass
communication. See generally LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly
Review Press 1971).
9 "Agitation or propaganda carried out with the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet state
or of committing particularly dangerous crimes against the state, the dissemination for the said purposes of
slanderous inventions that defame the Soviet political and social system, as well as the dissemination or
production or harboring for the said purposes of literature of similar content, are punishable by
imprisonment for a period from six months to seven years with or without exile from two to five years."
Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [RSFSR Criminal Code] art. 70, § 1, cited in JOHN & CAROL GARRARD, INSIDE THE
SOVIET WRITERS' UNION 137-38 (1990).
1o See generally SERGEI DOVLATOV, THE COMPROMISE (Anne Frydman trans., Academy Chicago
Publishers 1990) (recounting a fictional account of a Soviet journalist engaged in a constant struggle with
editorial and self-censorship).
" "Genuine consensus" is rather difficult to identify, as it rarely takes the form of the embodiment of
the popular will as it is commonly understood. For example, Walter Lippmann sees consensus as
something that must be constructed by the media and other institutions that can influence public opinion,
rather than a collective will translated by the state into coherent policy. He sees the persuasive techniques
employed by modem democracies, or "manufacture of consent," as a positive force and a "regular organ of
popular government." WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 248 (1922). For a contemporary analysis and
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government must align itself with the consensus by "rely[ing] on symbols
and accounts of national identity compatible with [state] institutions. 1 2 The
discursive power of such representations of identity is particularly apparent
in Putin's Russia. Yuri Levada, Director of the All-Russia Center for the
Study of Public Opinion, notes that, "[tihe fewer real successes there are (in
the economy, international affairs, the Chechen war), the greater the
significance acquired by such symbolic actions as the pushing through of the
'Aleksandrov-Mikhailkov' national anthem13  and the 'subjugation' of
NTV.
''14
Though common to all societies, employing the politics of identity
can pose significant risk to democratic values. Levada's examples of the
"new" national anthem and the de facto nationalization of NTV represent
two very different consequences of the state's interest in promoting
consensual identity. The national anthem, though contrived, seems to be a
genuine attempt to fashion a symbol with which the people can identify.
Appropriating the largest independent television network in Russia, though,
is a rather extreme method of seizing control of the primary means of
identity production.
In the case of NTV, as with the cases of other television networks
discussed later in this comment, the Putin administration justified its
intervention by demonizing the network owners and employing rhetoric to
suggest that only the state has the resources available to protect the media
industry from exploitation by the oligarchs or against financial insolvency.'
5
By stepping in to seize control of the airwaves, the state reinforces its
capacity to secure familiar categories of meaning and privilege values in
critique of this proposition, see generally EDWARD HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING
CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1988).
12 James Richter, Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy, in THE
SOURCES OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR, 70, 69-94 (Celeste A. Wallander ed., 1996).
13 This anthem is composed of the music of the Soviet national anthem with new, non-ideological
lyrics. See Hanson, supra note 4, at 333.
14 Yuri Levada, Actions and Symbols: The Success or Failure of the Ruling Team's Endeavors Has
Virtually No Effect on the President's Rating, NEZAVISIMAYA, May 16, 2001, at 9-10. NTV, the first
independent national television network in Russia, was founded by Vladimir Gusinsky, a self-styled
oligarch with connections to the Yeltsin family. See generally A.A. MUKHIN, INFORMATSIONNAIA VOINA
v ROSSII: UCHASTNIKI, TSELI, TEKHNOLOGII [INFORMATION WAR IN RUSSIA: PARTICIPANTS, OBJECTIVES,
TECHNOLOGY] (2000). In summer 2000, Gusinsky was arrested on charges of fraud, beginning an assault
that ended with the transfer of ownership of NTV to the state-controlled gas monopoly, Gazprom. Id.
NTV was the first target in a two-year Kremlin campaign to extinguish independent television in Russia.
,5 Putin explains that, "a free press is, in effect, only emerging" in Russia, and that it is necessary "to
build an economic foundation upon which a free and independent press could exist in its own right." Putin
Promises Non-interference in Russian TV6 Row, Denounces "Oligarchs, " BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
Jan. 15, 2002, at http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/index.shtml. A crucial element of Putin's program to
strengthen the state has been to discredit and disempower the oligarchs who owned and exercised editorial
control over electronic and print media. Id.
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alliance with its objectives. 16 The government takes part in defining social
institutions such as the mass media by means of regulatory practices and the
public policy that informs these practices. This piece offers a translation of
a policy document that extends the state's purview into domains of meaning
that may have a substantial effect on the state's relationship with the mass
media. The discursive practices of identity construction and invention of
threat employed in the "Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian
Federation"'" (the "Doctrine") will be analyzed in order to understand its
implications for free speech in Russia.
Part II offers a survey of the Doctrine's content and the political
context in which it was issued. Part III applies methods of "policy discourse
analysis"' 18 to selections of translated text with special attention to the way in
which cultural codes reinforced in political discourse can be enlisted in the
service of the state. Part IV provides an overview of how the Putin
administration's objective of promoting the growth of a "strong state" can be
understood in the terms of discursive mechanisms of information policy. It
will also include an analysis of the Kremlin's administrative harassment of
the major television networks, and indicate how this practice is likely to
affect the operation of independent broadcasting in the near future.
1I. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
The Security Council' 9 of the Russian Federation began drafting the
Doctrine in 1994, but due to a series of political and economic crises and
changes in leadership, no initiative had been taken to finalize and adopt the
policy before Vladimir Putin was elected. Putin's professional
background, 20  especially his work in Yeltsin's Security Council and
"6 The effect of these discursive practices employed by the state is that "boundaries are constructed,
spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and
alternatives marginalized." DAVID CAMPBELL, WRITING SECURITY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 68 (1992).
17 Security Council of the Russian Federation, Doktrina Informatsionnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation], http://www.scrf.gov.ru/
Documents/Decree/2000/09-09.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
18 See generally BILL MCSWEENEY, SECURITY, IDENTITY & INTERESTS: A SOCIOLOGY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999).
'9 The Council's function is to provide economic, military, information, ecological and other forms
of security, and to protect the interests of individuals, society, and state against internal and external threats.
Zakon RF o Bezopasnosti ot 22 Dekabria 1992, No. 4235-1 [RF Law on Security 22 Dec. 1992, No. 4235-
1]. The Council's decisions are not legally binding, but are frequently used as a basis for presidential
decrees, which do not need legislative approval.
20 In the early 1990's, after a 15-year career in the KGB, Putin began to work in the St. Petersburg
local government. In 1996, he was brought to the Kremlin by Boris Yeltsin's inner circle as deputy chief
Kremlin administrator. By 1998, he had been appointed head of the Federal Security Service, assigned to
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subsequent election as president, facilitated the completion and execution of
the policy document. The document received significant public attention
immediately after it was released, with both the Kremlin and the
independent media seeking to promote their respective interpretations of the
policy document's genuine aims. Putin insisted that the policy's objective
was to guarantee the protection of "strategically important" information,"
while members of the press charged that the Doctrine devoted a
disproportionate amount of attention to the mass media.22 When questioned
by reporters about the policy's impact on the media, Anatoly Streltsov,
Deputy Head of the Department of Information Security of the Security
Council, answered that it should serve as a guideline for programming for
the state-owned media, as it should bear the responsibility of providing a
clear, unambiguous picture of government policy. 2 3  Former Security
Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov, 24 in an interview with the newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, indicated that the Doctrine's provisions regarding the
mass-media were intended to remedy the lack of "truthful information
[citizens] need about the activity of the state authorities and these
authorities' plans and intentions., 25 This pronouncement has done little to
the position of Secretary of the presidential Security Council in March of that year, then made acting
president on December 31, 1999. See generally VLADMR PUTIN ET. AL., FIRST PERSON (Catherine A.
Fitzpatrick trans., 2000).
2 Speaking at a Security Council meeting on June 23, 2000 about the purpose of introducing new
information security policies, Putin emphasized that Russia's dependence on foreign producers of
computers and telecommunications systems represents a serious threat to national security. Oleg Vladykin,
Instrument Gosudarstvennoi SMIkalki [Instrument of State Cunning], OBSCHAIA GAZETA, June 29, 2000, at
2. Three days after the Doctrine's adoption, the FSB (successor to Soviet era KGB) Public Relations
Center circulated a report about the arrest of a double agent of U.S. and Lithuanian secret services who had
been attempting to penetrate the FSB's computer network. Id. On the same day, the FSB released news
about the capture of an audio-cassette from Chechen separatists containing information about the
difficulties Chechen leaders were having in controlling their field commanders. Id. Some interpreted the
timely release of the reports as an orchestrated attempt to gamer support for stricter security measures. Id.
22 Mikhail Fedotov, Pravo na Informatsiiu i (ili) Bezopastnost' [Right to Information and (or)
Security], INDEKS/DOS'E NA TSENZURU, Apr., 2001, at 54. Mikhail Fedotov (Secretary of the Writer's
Union of the Russian Federation and one of the authors of the Russian Mass Media Law) points out that the
word "defense" is used in the Doctrine twenty times, while the phrase "mass-media" is used twenty-seven
times. Id.
23 Sergei Ivanov, explaining the relevance of the Doctrine to the mass media, asserts that the
independent media does not provide "sufficiently truthful information about the actions of the state, its
plans, its intentions." David Hoffman, KGB Comes in From the Cold, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2000, at
Al. 24 Ivanov was replaced by Vladimir Rushailo in March of 2001 and appointed Minister of Defense.
Valerii Volkov, Putin Transfers Members of Security Council into Cabinet, IZVESTIIA, Mar. 29, 2001, at 1.
25 Rol' i Mesto Soveta Bezopasnosti RF v Sisteme Upravleniia Gosudarstvom [The Role of the
Security Council of the Russian Federation in the Administration of the State], NEZAVISIMAYA, Nov. 29,
2000. Ivanov, expounding on the administration's concern about increasing criticism from the press,
explains that "society is judging the authorities' intentions on the basis of random, fragmented,
contradictory information. This has become a serious obstacle to communication between the authorities'
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relieve the unease of journalists whose work may not correspond with the
government's interpretation of the "truth."
A few months later, shortly after the Doctrine was signed by the
President, journalists were greatly alarmed by Press Minister Mikhail
Lesin's 26 announcement that amendments to the Mass Media Law27 were
being considered in light of the new Doctrine.28  The potential danger to
press freedom was magnified by the fact that it represents the work of the
Security Council of the Russian Federation.29  A. Simonov points out that
the Security Council's involvement in the drafting of the Doctrine is
especially troubling due to the fact that the document addresses not only
threats to but alsofrom the mass-media.30
representatives and the population. A graphic example is the fundamental provisions of social reform and
in particular the reform of education. After numerous statements and subsequent denials, it is scarcely
possible to understand what the state intends to do in spheres affecting the vital interests of virtually every
Russian." Id.
26 Press Minister Mikhail Lesin had already earned a reputation as an official with little concern for
freedom of the press. In an interview on the subject, he is reported to have said, "I do not agree with the
thesis that the state is more dangerous to the media than the media is to the state. I believe quite the
opposite." Robert Coalson, A Civil Society Or A "Dictatorship Of Law? ", GLOBAL BEAT SYNDICATE, at
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/Coalson03l300.html (Mar. 13, 2000).
" Press Minister Hints at New Controls on Foreign Media, Interfax Russian News, Oct. 3, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Russia File.
28 The full text of the Russian Federation Law on Mass Media [hereinafter Mass Media Law], signed
by President Boris Yeltsin on Dec. 27, 1991, is available in translation in the appendix to Monroe Price,
Comparing Broadcast Structures: Transnational Perspectives and Post-Communist Examples, CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11 app. 625-55, (1992). See also MONROE PRICE, TELEVISION, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND
NATIONAL IDENTITY (1995). Evaluating the Mass Media Law's detailed provisions for the protection of an
independent press, he qualifies the law as a "breakthrough," and an example of the move towards law to
protect democratic principles. However, his enthusiasm is tempered by the pervasive presence of the state
in the statutory language. Though journalists are given an array of affirmative rights, they are also
burdened with substantial liability. Some examples include a penalty of being stripped of accreditation for
distributing false, defamatory information about a state organ (Article 48), and list of potential sanctions for
those who misuse their journalistic privilege of access to information (Articles 59, 60). Id. at 114.
29 In fact, it has been called by some, the "new Politburo." Richard F. Staar, Russia's New
Politburo, Perspectives, at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/staar.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002). (The
Politburo was a Soviet-era bureaucratic organ established to manage the affairs of the Communist Party in
between plenary sessions of the Central Committee. It quickly evolved into the supreme executive and
legislative body of the Soviet Union under Stalin. Nominally elected by members of the Central
Committee, the Politburo remained a government body held accountable only to the Party elite.) Since
Putin has taken office, the Security Council has been dominated by'former officers of the KGB and its
subordinate agencies. Id. The experience and training of these intelligence officers are quite suited to the
production of truths, or to "the creation of a phantom delusive space ... [by] ... a process of fabrication of
a certain legend, a myth, a way of life." Les Tanyuk, KGB: Creation of Phantom Space or the Dead Man
Catches the Living, in 3 E. OZNOBKINA ET AL., KGB YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW 27 (1995). The
author adds that the reorganization of the Soviet KGB into the FSB of the Russian Federation has done
little to change the culture of the secret service agencies. Id.
30 "[T]here is a very clear trend of an increasing presence of the secret services in the information
sector. The Doctrine of Information Security could be seen as harmless document-after all, it is only a
policy. However, if the Doctrine exists as policy in a country that has never known freedom of
information, it will only lead to a situation resembling an old joke. The joke goes like this: A worker in a
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Specifying the field of information that a policy document intends to
address is necessarily an exercise in interpretation, but laws on information
security generally provide definitive terms to indicate the scope of
information being regulated. For example, the Russian Federation Federal
Law on Information, Informatization, and the Protection of Information
31
extends the protection of information to areas in which the state has an
interest in protecting classified, commercial and proprietary, or personal
information.32  The Doctrine, however, does not explicitly define
"information," yet the doctrine purports to include forms of information not
normally conceived of in terms of security issues. Categorized as threats to
national security or vulnerable to threat, these forms of information become
subject to surveillance by the state. Reviewing an outline of the policy's
contents and its preamble should provide a general idea of the scope of the
Doctrine. 33  The headings and subheadings translated below can serve as a
broad topography of the information space under regulation.
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation
The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation
represents a synthesis of official positions on the objectives, tasks,
factory that produces machine guns steals one machine part every day to fulfill his wife's request to put
together a sewing machine for her. Every time, though, as soon as he puts the parts together, he ends up
with a machine gun. Exactly this happens when a Doctrine of Information Security is created by security
specialists, and not information specialists, because any application of the Doctrine will manifest itself in
restrictions on freedom of speech in one form or another." Interview with Alexei Simonov, President of the
Glasnost Defense Foundation (Radio Broadcast on "Ekho Moskvy," Jan. 16, 2001) (transcript available at
Glasnost Defense Foundation, at http://www.gdf.ru/old/arhiv/info008.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002)).
31 Information Act, RF Federal Act No. 24-FZ (1995), Ross. Gazeta, 22 Feb. 1995. Note that
"Informatization" (Informatizatsiia) is defined as "the organizational socioeconomic and scientific-
technical process of creating the optimal conditions for satisfying the information needs and implementing
the rights of citizens, agencies of state authority, agencies of local self-government, organizations, and
public associations on the basis of the formation and use of information resources." Id. art. 2.
32 The objects of protection are enumerated as: the prevention of leakage, theft, loss, distortion, or
forging of information; the prevention of the threats to the safety of an individual, society, or the state; the
prevention of unsanctioned actions to destroy, modify, distort, copy, or block information; the prevention
of other forms of illegal interference in information resources and information systems; the guaranteeing of
the legal conditions pertaining to documented information as an object of ownership; the protection of
citizens' constitutional rights to privacy and the confidentiality of the personal data contained in
information systems; the preservation of state secrecy, the confidentiality of documented information
according to law; the guaranteeing of the subjects' rights in the information processes and during the
development, production, and application of information systems, technologies, and their means of support.
Id. art. 20.
33 There is not an "outline" of the headings and subheadings in the original text. It has been
provided for the reader in order to demonstrate its scope, as the nearly 10,000-word document will not be
translated in its entirety.
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principles, and principal measures for ensuring information security
of the Russian Federation.
This doctrine serves as a basis for:
Development of state policy for maintaining information security of
the Russian Federation;
Preparation of proposals for the improvement of the legal, systemic,
engineering, and logistic support of information security of the
Russian Federation;
Development of programs for the support of information security in
the Russian Federation;
This doctrine elaborates the Concept of National Security of the
Russian Federation as applied to information sector.
OUTLINE OF DOCTRINE
I. Information Security of the Russian Federation
1. National interests of the Russian Federation in the
information sector and protection of these interests
2. Types of threats to information security of the Russian
Federation
3. Sources of threats to information security of the Russian
Federation
4. Condition of information security of the Russian
Federation and main problems of its protection
II. Methods of ensuring information security of the Russian
Federation
1. Primary methods of ensuring information security of the
Russian Federation
2. Particular features of ensuring information security of




* Science and technology
" Spiritual life
" State information and telecommunication systems
" Defense
* Law and law enforcement
" States of emergency
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3. International cooperation of the Russian Federation in
ensuring information security
IlI. General principles of state policy on ensuring information
security of the Russian Federation and immediate measures
for its realization
1. General principles of state policy on ensuring
information security of the Russian Federation
2. Immediate measures for the realization of state policy on
maintaining information security of the Russian
Federation
IV. Organizational basis of the system of ensuring information
security of the Russian Federation
1. Principal functions of the system of ensuring information
security of the Russian Federation
2. Principal elements of the organizational basis of the
system of information security of the Russian Federation
III. ANALYSIS OF POLICY DISCOURSE IN THE DOCTRINE
A. Information Sovereignty and External and Internal Threats
In the last decade, the increased recognition of the importance of
information and communication technology to the prosperity and security of
nations has prompted the development of a body of literature on the theory
of "information sovereignty. 3 4  In the broadest terms, the principle of
sovereignty can be understood as "the legal expression of the character and
34 Though the concept of information sovereignty is not recognized in international law, it has been
an issue of dispute since as early as the late 1970s. In 1977, the Director-General of UNESCO appointed
an International Commission for Study of Communication Problems (MacBride Commission) to formulate
"ways through which a freer and more balanced international flow of information and a more just and
effective new world information order (NWICO) might be fostered." WILLIAM G. HARLEY, CREATIVE
COMPROMISE: THE MACBRIDE COMMISSION 8 (1993). The Soviet Union led a coalition of the socialist
bloc and third world nations with proposals on methods to combat the "cultural imperialism" resulting from
the dominance of ideas and information from the West because of its greater technological capacities. Id.
The industrialized West insisted that any regulation of communication would be contrary to the principle of
the "free flow of information," but an overwhelming majority of nations contended that the free flow
concept is simply a pretext for commercial exploitation of the media and incursion into national
sovereignty. Id. Differences were never resolved, the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew
from UNESCO, and NWICO was eventually abandoned. Id. See also HISHAm NAZER, POWER OF A THIRD
KIND: THE WESTERN ATTEMPT TO COLONIZE THE GLOBAL VILLAGE (1999). "What is happening in many
developing countries today is not so much the absence of cultural sophistication as the absence of modem
instruments to implement that sophistication," making even nations with long cultural traditions susceptible
to cultural extinction. Id. at 136.
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legitimacy of the state."35 Historically, the concept of sovereignty has been
applied to various features of the nation-state, the most widely accepted
being territorial sovereignty. Applying this physical metaphor of legal
doctrine to a conceptual landscape, or "information space," this
contemporary interpretation of sovereignty suggests the ultimate authority of
the nation-state to regulate its information and media networks.36
The literature on foreign policy discourse analysis 37  offers an
instructive model for interpreting the relationship between security policy
documents and the boundaries of state sovereignty. This approach rests on
the premise that the external referents of national security policies are
expressed in terms of the outside threats to the nation and its peoples.38 This
characterization of how the state positions itself against these threats, or the
"discourse of danger," 39 serves to crystallize an identity that functions as a
nation's locus of meaning. Explicit dangers are typically enumerated in
security policy documents as part of an aggregation of real and imagined
threats to military and civilian objects and to a community's overall sense of
security.
40
35 R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 165 (1993).
A definition from a leading dictionary may be useful in appreciating the range of independent, but not
mutually exclusive, understandings of the concept of sovereignty: "[t]hat public authority which
commands in civil society, and orders and directs what each citizen is to perform to obtain the end of its
institution." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
36 Though "information sovereignty" is not recognized in international law, it is commonly invoked
by governments to support domestic policies on mass communication. MEDIA AND GLOBALIZATION: WHY
THE STATE MArERS (Nancy Morris & Silvio Waisbord eds., 2001). A variety of policy models have been
applied in different countries to advance the interests of both state and society. Some governments, such as
Mexico's and Brazil's, have a "statist policy" to protect domestic media producers from international media
centers like Hollywood. France, for example, also subsidizes its film industry, and Ireland supports Gaelic
language media for the purpose of protecting national communities or "shaping real or imaginary cultural
borders." Id. at xiii.
37 See generally DAVID CAMPBELL, WRITING SECURITY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
POLITICS OF IDENTITY (1992); Ala Kassianova, Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State
Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse, 6 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 821 (2001); MICHAEL J.
SHAPIRO, READING THE POSTMODERN POLITY: POLITICAL THEORY AS TEXTUAL PRACTICE (1992).
38 "Foreign policy (conventionally understood as the external orientation of pre-established states
with secure identities) is thus to be re-theorized as one of the boundary-producing practices central to the
production and reproduction of identity in whose name it operates." CAMPBELL, supra note 16, at 68.
39 The post-Enlightenment nation-state, Campbell asserts, having divorced itself from the
ecclesiastical authority of the Church, and consequently severing the direct link to God, needed a new
paradigm for grounding its identity and strengthening its legitimacy. To fill this void, the state relied on the
fear of (very real) external threats, to "provide a new theology of truth about who and what 'we' are by
highlighting who or what 'we' are not, and what 'we' have to fear." Id. at 48.
4 This is not to say that the elaboration of a security policy is a purposeful exercise of conjuring an
"identity," nor is it necessarily coextensive with identity formation. Security policies are simply one of an
ensemble of practices to inscribe, externalize, and totalize dangers and mobilize people to neutralize these
dangers, "all in the name of a social totality that was never really present and that is never more than an
effect of the practices by which total dangers are inscribed." Richard K. Ashley, Living on Border Lines:
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Information security and sovereignty, however, are closely
interrelated concepts,4 1 and it is rather simple to conflate concrete measures
for protecting information with drawing boundaries to protect an artificially
constructed sovereignty. A substantial proportion of the Doctrine consists of
hypothetical threats to the information space of the Russian Federation. In
fact, there are two entire sections that expound upon a litany of potential
threats and their sources. Much of the text in these sections is remarkably
incongruent with the stated policy objectives, and as pointed out earlier,
reveals a preoccupation with the mass-media. The following selection is an
example of some of the extraordinary language of the text:
2. Types of threats to information security of the Russian Federation
According to their general targets, the threats to information
security of Russian Federation are subdivided into the following
types:
" Threats to constitutional rights and individual liberties in spiritual
life and information activity, to individual, group and public
consciousness, and to the spiritual rebirth of Russia;
* Threats to the preservation of information about the state policies
of the Russian Federation;
* Threats to the development of the domestic information
technology industry, including the mass media,
telecommunications, and post, to sustaining demand for domestic
products and export of these products to the world market, as well
as to the collection, preservation, and efficient use of domestic
information resources;
* Threats to the security of information and telecommunication
media and system, including those already established, as well as
those to be introduced on the territory ofRussia.
Threats to the constitutional rights and individual liberties in the
area of spiritual life, to individual, group, and collective
Man, Postructuralism, and War, in INTERNATIONALIJNTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS: POSTMODERN READINGS
OF WORLD POLITICS 303, (James Der Derian & Michael Shapiro eds., 1989).
4 Ukraine is now in the process of developing a new information security policy, and many of the
same issues are being discussed. Olexandr Baranov, Information Sovereignty or Information Security?,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE (2001), http://www.uceps.com.ua/eng/all/j oumal/200 1/html/70.
shtmI. Ivan Drach, head of the State Committee for Information Policy and TV and Radio Broadcasting,
concerned about the critical weakness of the Ukrainian mass-media under the flood of foreign information
sources, proposes a committee on issues of "information security" to remedy the imbalance by providing
legal and institutional frameworks for the growth of the Ukrainian information space. ElM MEDIA REPORT
FROM THE CIS, at http://www.intemews.ru/eim/january200l/uae.html (Jan. 2001).
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consciousness, and to the spiritual rebirth of Russia can materialize
as:
" Adoption of laws by federal or regional governments of the
Russian Federation that violate constitutional rights and
individual liberties in the area of spiritual life and information
activity;
* Creation of monopoly on the formation, reception and
dissemination of information in the Russian Federation, as well as
by means of telecommunication systems;
" Obstruction by criminal structures of the realization of citizens'
constitutional rights to privacy of personal information,
correspondence, telephone conversations, and other forms of
communication;
" Excessive restriction of access to information vital to the public
interest;
* Unlawful use of subliminal messages and other methods of
influencing collective consciousness;
" Non-execution by federal, regional, and municipal governments of
federal laws regulating the information sector;
* Unlawful restriction of citizens' access to open information
resources of federal, regional, and municipal government
agencies, to public archives, and to other socially important
information;
" Disintegration of the system of collecting and archiving of
national treasures;
* Displacement of Russian information agencies and mass media
from the domestic market and increasing the spiritual, economic,
and political dependency of Russia on Western information
structures;
" Degradation of spiritual values, propaganda of models of mass
culture based on the cult of violence, and on moral values
contradictory to values accepted in Russian society.
" Weakening the spiritual, moral, and creative potential of the
Russian peoples, which substantially complicates the training of
the work force for the introduction and use of new technologies
such as information technologies;
" Manipulation of information (disinformation, concealment or
distortion of information).
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Threats to information security of state policy of the Russian
Federation can materialize as:
* Monopolization of the Russian information market, and its
partitioning into domestic and foreign information sectors;
* Obstruction of the state mass-media's efforts to inform Russian
and foreign audiences;
" Ineffectiveness of information security of the state policy of the
Russian Federation as a consequence of a deficit in qualified
professionals, and an absence of a system for developing and
realizing state information policy ....
3. Sources of threats to information security of the Russian
Federation.
The sources of threats to information security of the Russian
Federation can be categorized as foreign and domestic. The foreign
sources include:
* Activities offoreign political, economic, military, surveillance and
information structures directed against the interests of the Russian
Federation in the information sector,
" The intent of a number of countries to dominate the global
information infrastructure, encroaching upon Russia's interests
and displacing Russia from foreign and domestic markets;
* Intensification of international competition for control of
information technologies and resources;
" Activities of international terrorist organizations;
* Growth of disparity in the level of technology of leading world
powers and the escalation of their ability to inhibit Russia's
development of competitive information technology;
" Activities of space, air, sea, and land, technical and other methods
of surveillance offoreign states;
" Development of concepts of information warfare by a number of
states that would lead to the creation of a dangerous influence on
information sectors of other countries, the violation of normal
functioning of information and telecommunication systems, safety
of information resources, and the reception of unsanctioned
access to these resources.
Domestic sources of threat include:
* Critical condition of national branches of industry;
" The adverse criminal environment, accompanied by a tendency
towards convergence of state and criminal structures in the
VOL. I I No. 2
RUSSIA'S INFORMATION SECURITY DOCTRINE
information sector, criminal structures receiving access to
confidential information, strengthening of the influence of
organized crime on society, reduction of the level of defense of the
legal interests of citizens, society and state in the information
sector;
* Inadequate coordination of the activity of federal and regional
agencies of the Russian Federation for the development and
realization of a unified state policy for maintaining information
security of the Russian Federation;
* Inadequate elaboration of a normative legal foundation for
regulating relations in the information sector, as well as
inadequate enforcement;
* Underdevelopment of institutions of civil society and insufficient
state control over the development of the information market of
Russia;
* Inadequate funding of measures for the maintenance of
information security of the Russian Federation;
" Inadequate economic strength of the state;
* The decline in effectiveness of the educational system, an
insufficient quantity of qualified personnel in the area of
protection of information security;
* Insufficient activity of federal and regional agencies of the
Russian Federation in informing the public about their activity, in
explaining decisions, in forming government information
resources, and development of an open system for citizens to
access these resources;
* The disparity between Russia and leading world powers in the
level of informatization offederal agencies, regional agencies of
the Russian Federation and agencies of local self-administration,
credit-financial sector, industry, agriculture, education, health,
services, and everyday life of citizens.
In Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual
Practice, Michael J. Shapiro analyzes the "politics of fear" in security
policies and examines the discursive effects of textual representations of
nation, community, and individual. Explaining the relatively recent
phenomenon of the "nation-state," he cites Michel Foucault's observation
that the eighteenth century brought about the displacement of the sovereign
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as the primary signifier of the nation.42 In the sovereign's place, the
relatively new concept of "the population" as a collective identity emerged.43
External threats, then, become a pervasive danger that circulates throughout
the entire population. This dynamic becomes an "integral part of the
grammar of modem 'security."44
Articulating external threat in these terms, then, leads to an enclosure
that distinguishes the community from the outside world "with the paradigm
of sovereignty exceed[ing] a simple geographic partitioning: it results in a
conception of divergent moral spaces. 45 The state exercises its authority to
establish the conceptual boundaries that separate the community from the
"Other" by means of discursive strategies ranging from the espousal of
official ideologies to the institutionalization of normative codes through the
legal and economic systems. In the development of national security
policies, employing the politics of identity is a powerful tool for
strengthening the state.46
B. The Politics of Identity
The concept of "national identity" is typically mythologized as an
immortal constant existing in the spirit of the people. Identity, however,
does not have a prediscursive existence. Rather, it is through the
"production of truth" that this social construct upon which society depends
for order and meaning is generated.47 Louis Althusser suggests that the
discourse of the state ideological apparatus 48  is the mechanism that
42 SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 125.
43 id.
One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the
emergence of 'population' as an economic and political problem: population was wealth,
population as manpower, or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and
the resources it commanded. Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with
subjects, or even with a 'people,' but with a 'population.'
Id. (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 25 (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon Books
1978)).
44Id.
"4 CAMPBELL, supra note 16, at 73.
46 Habermas, supra note 6, at 116. Habermas warns that, "the artificiality of national myths, both in
their learned origins and their dissemination through propaganda, makes nationalism intrinsically
susceptible to misuse by political elites." Id.
7 MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEW AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-
1977 130 (Colin Gordon trans., Pantheon Books 1980).
48 Reality and relative values are represented in the ideological state apparatus, whose material form
exists in institutions such as the political system, the family, the law, and the system of mass
communication. ALTHUSSER, supra note 8.
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constitutes us as subjects. Accepting the legitimacy of the state, we are
summoned by ideologies that recast us as their "authors. ' 49 The scope of our
narrative is confined to a space defined by the parameters of ideology and its
authenticity is reinforced by the historical and cultural sources from which
the narrative is derived. The degree of public involvement in the elaboration
of this narrative is certain to have a profound effect on the development of
the society's democratic values.50 Commenting on Russia's transition to
democracy, Monroe Price asserts that society "will not achieve cohesion
without substantial public involvement in defining, organizing, and
propounding a credible and pluralistic national identity."'
Philosophical constructs that are not entirely congruent with the
democratic concept of public involvement in defining social order are fairly
common in Russian political thought. The "Eurasianists," for example, were
a prominent school of thinkers who claimed the distinctiveness of Russia
from the West.5 2 They argued that Russian society and politics is founded
on the idea of a "Government of Truth" unlike the "Government of Law"
characteristic of the West.5 3 "Heroes" ruled in the Government of Truth, and
people would be guided by the moral foundation idealized in the sovereign.
The Eurasianists assert the superiority of Russia to other cultures precisely
because its value system transcends, rather than submits to the rational-
legalistic paradigm of liberal democracies. In line with the Hegelian concept
of ultimate freedom resting in the priority of collective liberty over
individual autonomy, the Eurasianists assert that the nation-state, as it
49 Stuart Hall, Signification, Representation, Ideology: AIthusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates,
CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS COMMUNICATION 99 (1986).
50 Monroe Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competition for
Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667, 681 (1994).
51 Id.
52 Positions of public and political figures in. Russia that may be characterized as "Eurasianists"
range from fairly moderate to quite radical. Moderates generally hold that the West would prefer that
Russia remain a marginal player in the international arena, but willing to enter into pragmatic relationships
with Western countries in order to advance its own interests. See generally Andrei P. Tsygankov, From
International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of
Contemporary Russia, 41 MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 247 (1997). Extremists/Nationalists see the West as
intent on global hegemony, and believe that Russia has the unique capacity, and obligation, to prevent the
emergence of a unipolar world order. Id. Sergei Baburin is an example of this school of thought, as he
charges that "the West is foisting its 'anti-national' democracy [on Russia], using it as a tool to atomize and
dismantle Russian civilization." ILYA PRIZEL, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY: NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN POLAND, RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 256 (1998) (citing interview with Sergei Baburin, MOSCOW
NEWS, Feb. 12, 1992, in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow News File).
53 I.A. ISAEVA, ED., PUTt EVRAZII: RUSSKAIA INTELLIGENTSIIA I SUDBY ROSS[I [THE RUSSIAN
INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE FATE OF RUSSIA] (1992).
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represents the collective will of the people, is the only institution that can
guarantee true freedom. 54  It is interesting to note that Vladimir Putin
promoted this idea in his February 2000 "Open Letter to Russian Voters, 55
asserting that, "the stronger the state, the freer the individual. 56
Identity seems to take on greater importance in times of instability.
The crisis of representation in Russia is especially acute as the country
emerges from a period of its history in which the community was defined by
the state.57 The 1996 presidential election, for example, offered the Russian
electorate a particularly troubling choice between the past and the future.
The ailing Boris Yeltsin and the candidate from the Communist Party,
Gennadii Zyuganov, were the only serious contenders, and they both
advanced competing notions of identity as elements of their campaigns.
Deciding to directly address the question of national identity, President Boris
Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament arranged a public forum. The
Parliament's newspaper, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, started a public discussion and
competition to compose a "national idea" representative of the future of
contemporary Russia, in light of its past. Over approximately a year, it
published more than 200 articles, essays, and letters addressing this problem,
to little effect.58
The conflicts in Chechnya have also weakened the public's trust in the
government, as Moscow has been unable to bring closure to its campaign
against separatist movements in the region. Viacheslav Polosin's survey,
Mif Religiia, Gosudarstvo [Myth, Religion, State], offers a striking example
of contemporary Russia's active engagement with the politics of identity to
legitimize state policies. After losing the "information war" in Chechnya, a
14 ALAN PAITEN, HEGEL'S IDEA OF FREEDOM 135 (1999).
The capacity for freedom is not something that every human being automatically has, but is
developed and sustained only in the context of a community of mutual recognition: it is the
recognition of other free agents that reinforces the idea of oneself as free that is essential to
being free.
Id.
55 POLIT.RU NEWS, Otkrytoe Pis'mo Vladimira Putina Rossiiskim Izbirateliam [Open Letter from
Vladimir Putin to Russian Voters], at http://www.polit.ru/documents/I85350.html (Feb. 25, 2000).
56 Id.
57 Sergei Stankevich, in a paper calling for the formulation of a national idea, wrote, "There is no
great idea ... and [consequently] smuta sets in." Smuta was the period of anarchy in the 17th century of
revolts, foreign intervention, and false pretenders to the throne. Carey Goldberg, Russia's Identity Crisis,
L. A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1992.
58 Sociologist Sergei Oushakine rated the results of this competition as ranging from "the obsessive
aphasic reproduction of the already familiar to the metonymic cataloguing of the already available and
articulated ideas." Sergei Oushakine, In the State of Post-Soviet Aphasia: Symbolic Development in
Contemporary Russia, 52 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 991, 1004 (2000).
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Special Commission prepared a report entitled, "Mythology of the Chechen
Crisis as an Indicator of the Problem of the National Security of the Russian
Federation. 59 The report attributed the failure of the Chechen military
campaign partly to the state's inability to "develop a coordinated structure of
state authority in [creating] a 'symbolic reality' that corresponds to public
opinion and ideology.,
60
The following translated selection from the Doctrine is particularly
representative of the discursive practices employed to invoke historical
identity:
6. Particular features of ensuring information security of the
Russian Federation in various areas of life
" Information security is one of the components of national security
of the Russian Federation and it has a bearing on the protection
of national interests of the Russian Federation in various areas of
the society and state. Threats to information security of the
Russian Federation and methods for its protection are consistent
across these areas.
• Within each area, there are particularfeatures of the maintenance
of information security connected to specific security objects, to
the degree of their vulnerability to threats to information security
of the Russian Federation. In each area of society and state life in
combination with general methods of preserving the information
security of the Russian Federation, particular measures can be
implemented that are relevant to specific factors affecting
information security of the Russian Federation.
In the area of spiritual life
* Protection of information security of the Russian Federation in
the area of spiritual life aims to defend constitutional rights and
individual liberties related to individual development and social
conduct, press freedom, the maintenance of cultural and moral
heritage, historical traditions and social norms, the preservation
of the cultural heritage of all the peoples of Russia, protection of
constitutional limits of individual rights and liberties in the
interests of the preservation and strengthening of moral values of
society, traditions and humanism, health of its citizens, cultural
59 VIACHESLAV POLOSIN, MwF, RELIGnA, GOSUDARSTVO: ISSLEDOVANIE POLITICHESKOI MIFOLOGII
[MYTH, RELIGION, STATE: EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY] 12 (1999).
60 id.
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and scientific potential of the Russian Federation, and
maintaining the defense capabilities and security of the state.
The following are objects ofprotection of information security
of the Russian Federation:
" Personal dignity, freedom of conscience, including the right to
choose, (have) and propagate religious and other beliefs and act
in accordance with these beliefs, freedom of thought and speech
(with the exception of propaganda or agitation inciting social,
racial, national, or religious hatred and hostility), as well as
freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, technical and other forms
of creation and instruction;
" Freedom of the press;
" Inviolability ofpersonal life, personal andfamily privacy;
" The Russian language as a factor of spiritual unity of the peoples
of a diverse Russia, the common language of international
discourse of the peoples of the states of the Commonwealth of
Independent States;
" Languages, moral values and cultural heritage of the peoples and
nationalities of the Russian Federation; [and]
* Objects of intellectualproperty.[or .... if appropriate]
The following threats to the information security of the
Russian Federation present the greatest danger to [the
nation's] spiritual life:
" Degradation of the mass media as a result of its monopolization,
and from the uncontrolled expansion of the foreign mass media in
the domestic information sector;
* The deteriorating condition and gradual decay of articles of
Russian cultural heritage, including archives, museums, libraries,
and architectural monuments due to insufficient funding of
relevant programs and events;
" The potential disruption of public stability, causing harm to the
health and lives of people as a consequence of activities of
religious associations proselytizing religious fundamentalism, as
well as totalitarian religious sects;
" The use of media by foreign special services mass media
broadcasting on the territory of the Russian Federation to
compromise the defense capabilities of the country and state
security, and the spread of disinformation; [and]
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* The inability of Russia's modern civil society to ensure the young
generation 's development of constructive moral values,
patriotism, and civic responsibility for the fate of the country.
The primary methods in ensuring information security of the
Russian Federation in spiritual life are:
" Development of civil society in Russia;
* Creation of socio-economic conditions for the realization of
artistry and the functioning of cultural institutions;
" Development of civilized forms and methods of social control over
the formation of spiritual values in society, addressing the
interests of the country, cultivation of patriotism and civic
responsibility for the country'sfuture;
* Development of legislation of the Russian Federation regulating
the relationship in the domain of constitutional limits of individual
rights and liberties; [and]
" State support of measures for the preservation and rebirth of
cultural heritage of the peoples and nationalities of the Russian
Federation;
• Formation of legal and institutional mechanisms for protecting
constitutional rights and individual liberties, raising people's
legal consciousness in the interests of preventing the intentional
or inadvertent violation of these constitutional rights and
individual liberties in the area of spiritual life;
* Development of effective institutional and legal mechanisms for
access of citizens and the mass media to public information about
the activities of the federal government and civic organizations,
protecting the accuracy of information circulated by the mass
media about socially important events;
" Development of special legal and institutional mechanisms for
guarding against unlawful psychological influence on mass
consciousness, uncontrolled commercialization of culture and
science, as well as the preservation of national and historical
treasures of the peoples and nationalities of the Russian
Federation, rational use of society's information resources that
represent national treasures;
* Introduction of regulations prohibiting the use of broadcast time
in the electronic media for the sale of programs propagating
violence, cruelty, or antisocial behavior;
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* Prevention of negative influence offoreign religious organizations
and missionaries.
Sergei Oushakine conducted a sociological survey to examine
possible causes of the Russian peoples' "weak social identification. 61
Prompting the respondents to characterize Russia as a nation and then relate
the individual qualities of its citizens that contribute to its identity, he found
that many referred to the traditional concept of the dichotomy between
"material" (or "West") and the "spiritual" (or "East") to distinguish their
homeland. One respondent said, in reference to the flood of American pop
culture media that has poured into Russia in the last decade, "the new Russia
is a battle-field between the material and the spiritual. 62  Oushakine
concludes that Russia, "instead of being involved in the production of new
mythical narratives able to encompass the ongoing changes and to embrace
individuals in a collective entity," is mired in a nostalgic reproduction of
"parasitic" mythologies. 6 3  Oushakine asserts that the use of the
"undetermined signifier of 'the spiritual' represents society's "state of
general confusion. '64  It is precisely this "confusion" that facilitates the
assumption of mythological identities offered to the people through political
discourse.
65
This form of discourse is manifest in both policy documents and the
media. In an interview with Anatoly Streltsov and writer Aleksandr
Zinoviev on then independently owned NTV, Zinoviev praised the recently
issued Doctrine as an instrument for protecting the people from corruption,
charging that, "our country has been brought to a state of collapse. It has
been overcome by what they call information from the West. Totally and
61 Oushakine, supra note 58, at 993.
62 Id. at 1004.
63 Id. at 998.
Id. at 1004.
65 It is important to note that this identity is not simply an ideological fabrication of the state, but that
political discourse also shapes familiar historical mythologies. The widely held belief of Eastern
Christendom was that the Orthodox kingdom of Muscovy should assume the role of protectorate of the
Byzantine heritage. HAROLD BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA (1950). This conception "gave a spiritual
character to the Muscovy tsardom which has no parallel. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, for all his barbarism,
taught that a tsar must not only govern the body politic, but must also save souls." Id. at 133. This
mythological discourse has been elaborated, recontextualized, and reproduced in Russian literature and
philosophy as a faith that Russian people will bring about the ethical transformation and "spiritual
hegemony of mankind." G.P. FEDOTOV, SUD'BA I GREKHI ROSSI] [FATE AND SINS OF RUSSIA] 79 (1991).
Some attribute the character of spirituality to the Soviet Union as well. "The Soviet state is not a secular
but a religious state, in the sense that it is founded on an idea and a mission." BERMAN, supra note 65, at
16. According to Berman, secular Marxism had been "Russified," and "converted from a science of society
into a dogma, and has in turn become ritualized." Id.
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utterly. And we are in that mire." A recently adopted program of the
Ministries of Defense and Education serves as an example of the Kremlin's
active role in securing the identity of the state. In March of 2001, the
Kremlin drafted a program to exploit the state mass-media in order to foster
patriotic values and improve the well-being of society. The preface of the
program sets out the purpose to remedy "the growing poverty gap and the
loss of spiritual values: that have led 'to a gradual loss of traditional Russian
patriotism.'67 It intends to enlist state television to develop and increase the




A conference addressing post-Soviet national security issues
organized by a coalition of political parties offers an example of how
identity politics become intimately associated with the security of the state.
The participants' concept of national security is quite similar to that of the
definition propounded by the Doctrine: "National security is [composed of]
factors that maintain positive conditions for Russia's development, vitality of
the state, expedient development and preservation of its fundamental values
and traditions, natural relationship between the individual and the state,
[and] ability to effectively overcome any foreign threats . . . .70 The
conference participants noted that Russia should draw lessons from its
history, reminding readers that the nation has undergone periods of
accelerated modernization and Westernization that ultimately led to tragic
71consequences.
7
Identity discourse is necessarily a practice of exclusion, and it is this
practice, rather than the character of the constructed identity that is under
66 Hoffman, supra note 23.67 Simon Saradzhyan, Russia to Educate More Patriots, ST. PETERSBURG TtMES, Mar. 13, 2001. The
document goes on to say that "indifference, individualism, cynicism and unmotivated aggression and.
disrespect for the state have become widespread in society." Id.
Deputy Defense Minister Igor Puzanov, referring to a weekly television series entitled, "Serving
the Soviet Union," reminisced, "Remember how the entire country watched it every Sunday between 10
and 11 in the morning?" Oksana Yablokova, Military Arms Itself with TM Radio and Film, Moscow
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times File.
69 An official involved in drafting the program said that a relatively inexpensive method to foster
respect for the state would be to censor Western television programming, which he categorized as
unpatriotic "filth." Saradzhyan, supra note 67.
70 1u. A. ABRAMOV ET. AL., BELAIA KNtGA RossinsKIKH SPETSSLUZHB [WHITE PAPER ON RUSSIAN
SPECIAL SERVICES] 263 (1995) (emphasis added). The material continues by pointing out that the members
of the Russian elite involved in programs of reform are all being trained by foreign governments and non-
governmental Organizations ("NGOs"). Id. They argue that the majority of these programs are primarily
oriented to "an ideology of modernization just to catch up to the West." Id.
7 The Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 occurred during periods in which the monarchy was
pressing forward with modernization programs without attending to the basic needs of the people.
Similarly, in the U.S.S.R., Stalin's forced collectivization of farmland transformed destroyed a pastoral,
provincial lifestyle by imposing a factory-line order of production.
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scrutiny in this analysis.72  The text of the Doctrine, by allocating
responsibility for the spiritual integrity of Russia to mass media, draws both
into the domain of national security. Symbols of identity themselves, even
those with little genuine substance, have some potency if they are confronted
with danger. The threat to identity, whether it be an actual, material threat or
just convincingly fabricated, is more credible in today's Russia because of
the growing anxiety about its future. The values of "spirituality" and
"community" resonate with the public because they correspond to
mythological representations of the nation, and the Putin administration is
willing to exploit this. The discursive practices employed in the text of the
Doctrine serve to confirm the substance of identity, reveal its vulnerability to
external and internal threats, and justify protective measures. However, the
power of political discourse to reconstruct a centrality of meaning could
distort the lens of the mass media in Putin's Russia, and may ultimately
prove to compromise the viability of democracy.
IV. THE MEDIA
Cultural anthropologist Benedict Anderson argues that print
technologies and the corresponding growth in literacy in the nineteenth
century were the driving forces in the emergence of the concept of "national
consciousness., 73  The pluralistic democracies of the modem nation-state
became possible through the leveling qualities of print technologies.74 These
new technologies allowed people to feel a part of a cohesive "imagined
community," as they were able to experience past and current history from a
finite set of sources.75 The sources of information could represent a range of
ideological persuasions and political associations, but they would necessarily
position themselves within the same cultural referents. In print, and more
recently in electronic form, these sources became widely accessible to a
72 Grigory Yavlinsky, a prominent liberal in the State Duma, warns against engaging in identity
politics of exclusion. He maintains that a "pseudo-intellectual attempt to excuse the government's actions
by invoking the myth that Russia is unlike any other country," could be a destabilizing force in society.
Grigor Yavlinsky, Going Backwards, JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2001, at 83.
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNrIES (1991).
74 Anderson argues for, the liberating quality of "print capitalism," noting that the vertical hierarchy
of meaning attributed to autocratic rule is transformed into a horizontal order that would promote the
evolution of citizens according to a social order whose meaning could largely be determined by the people
themselves. Id. at 21.
" Anderson's allusion to Hegel's concept that "newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for
morning prayers" evokes an image of a ritualized ceremony that offers a spiritual connection amongst
citizens of one nation that may otherwise have very diverse religious and cultural backgrounds. Id. at 35.
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literate society, thus securing the distinctiveness and stability of the state
through the medium of identity.
In the last few decades, electronic media has supplanted print as the
primary source of information, but Anderson's metaphor is still relevant. In
his book examining the intersection of law, media, and identity, Monroe
Price pays special attention to television as an instrument and subject of state
power. Accounting for the particular interests of government in regulating
the airwaves, he remarks:
States will affect reception and reorganize the space in which
information can flow . . . . Television will be seen as the
facilitator of new regimes and as the engine for the retention of
power. These are contradictions inherent in concepts of
national identity, underscoring the complexity of harmonizing
the state's narrative with aspirations of freedom.76
A. "Independent" Television: The Cases of NTV & TV-6
The financial and political capital necessary to maintain an
independent television network in the Russian Federation has been a
prohibitive factor in establishing a a viable private broadcasting industry for
all but a few wealthy, well-connected oligarchs. In 1993, Vladimir
Gusinsky created NTV, the first independent national television network in
Russia.7 7 For the first two years, it gained notoriety for its uncompromising
coverage of the first Chechen war and other politically sensitive topics.78
This infuriated Boris Yeltsin, but by 1996 Gusinsky had managed to placate
him by slanting news coverage and providing resources for Yeltsin's
reelection campaign.79 In 1999, foreseeing Yeltsin's impending resignation,
Gusinsky shifted his alliance to prospective candidate Yuri Luzhkov, and
began to air very critical commentaries about the Kremlin.80 The Yeltsin
administration, with the help of Boris Berezovsky's ORT, destroyed
Luzhkov as a candidate for presidency in 2000 in favor of Vladimir Putin.
8 1
Only a few days after Putin's inauguration, Gusinsky was arrested on
76 PRICE, supra note 28, at 58-59.




80 See generally MUKHIN, supra note 14.
8' Remnick, supra note 3.
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charges of fraud, beginning an assault that ended with the transfer of
ownership of NTV to the state-controlled gas monopoly, Gazprom. 82
In late 2001, TV-6, the last independent television station in Russia
with national reach (and staffed by refugee journalists from NTV), was
liquidated by court order. A subsidiary of the Russian oil giant Lukoil,
Lukoil-Garant pension fund, had been a shareholder with a fifteen percent
stake in the television station. Lukoil-Garant, claiming that the station's
debts exceeded its assets for more than two years in a row, filed suit to
liquidate the company and recover its assets. 3 In January of 2002, a
Moscow higher arbitration court ordered that TV-6 be shut down,
"bring[ing] to an end a Kremlin campaign to bring independent television
stations to heel., 8 4 The future of TV-6 is uncertain at the moment, but it is
clear that it will be reconstituted as a channel more willing to appease the
Kremlin.
8 5
B. Television & Radio Broadcasting Networks
Now that independent television in Russia has been forced off the air,
Putin is likely to step up the reorganization of information space by
following through on the amendments he introduced regarding the regulation
of television broadcast facilities. In September of 2000, he issued a decree
that transferred the right to appoint the heads of the regional State Television
and Radio Companies ("GTRK") from the elected governors to the
"governor-generals" of the seven administrative districts.8 6  According to
First Deputy Press Minister Mikhail Seslavinskii, the decree was in response
to the alleged abuse of the media by regional officials for re-election
52 See generally MUKHIN, supra note 14.
83 Robin Munro, Shareholders Push to Shut Down TV6, Moscow TIMES, May 15, 2001, in LEXIS,
News Library, Moscow Times File.
84 Ben Aris, Court Closes Russia's Last Independent TV Station, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 12, 2002,
at 18.
85 This was not the first time that Lukoil has used its leverage to appease the Kremlin. Four years
ago, the newspaper Izvestiia printed an article about then Prime Minister Viktor Chemomyrdin's $5 million
fortune. Valery Yakov, Trying to Complete Their Seizure of the Country's Information Space, the
Authorities Begin an Attack on TV-6, NOVYE IZVESTIIA, Sept. 29, 2001, at 1-2. Chemomyrdin took
offense, and Lukoil, which owns a large block of Izvestiia shares, fired much of the newspaper's staff. Id.
86 O Formirovanii Edinogo Proizvodstvenno-Tekhnilogiceskogo Kompleksa Gosudarstvennykh
Sredstv Massovoi Informatsii [On the Formation of a Unified Technical Infrastructure for the State Mass
Media], Ross. GAZETA Sept. 23, 2000. These representatives of the executive branch were personally
appointed by Vladimir Putin to run seven federal districts. See generally Hahn, supra note 5. The
establishment of the post of "governor-general" was intended to strengthen the "vertical" system of power
and to rein in Russia's more independently minded governors and regional legislatures. Id.
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purposes87  This measure, in effect, means that the presidential
administration, rather than the electorate, will choose governors.88 The
transfer of control over the administration of regional broadcasters to
Moscow has not garnered the same degree of attention as the three episodes
involving NTV, ORT, and TV-6, but its impact may be far greater.89
The Kremlin has also shown an increased interest in creating and
administering new regional networks to extend its reach. For example, Press
Minister Mikhail Lesin and the head of the All-Russian State Television and
Radio Company ("VGTRK"), 90 Oleg Dobrodeyev, arranged to establish a
television station that would broadcast throughout the Siberian Federal
Administrative District.9' Yakov London, the general director of the
proposed network, said that the channel's main aim was to "correct
discontinuities in Siberia's informational area.", 92 Apparently, this will be a
model for further growth of federal administrative district TV channels,
allowing the Kremlin to have more influence on regional programming.
Another example of the Kremlin's intrusion into regional affairs
concerned the Republic of Bashkortostan, which had maintained its own
independent broadcasting company for a number of years.93 In May 2001,
87 Kremlin Moves to Oversee Governors Elections, RFE/RL (UN)CIVIL SOCIETIES, at
http://www.rferl.org/ucs/2000/10/22-121000.html (Oct. 12, 2000). Putin explained that this measure was to
allow the govemor-generals "to help the population to obtain objective information about candidates." Id.
88 Id.
89 According to an extensive survey conducted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ("RFE/RL") of
media empires in the Russian Federation, VGTRK "could become the successor to Soviet-era central
television." Floriana Fossato & Anna Kachkaeva, The Presidential Administration and the Federal
Government, RFE/RL SPECIAL REPORT-RuSSIAN MEDIA EMPIRES VI, at http://www.rferl.orgnca/special/
rumedia6/rumediaVIl.html (Sept. 2000). While it is not likely to be assigned the role of "The Official
Organ" occupied by the state central television network of the Soviet Union, it is clear that "one of the
main functions of the television and radio stations included in [VGTRK] is to defend and promote 'state
interests."' Id.
90 The VGTRK [Vse-Rossiskaiia Gosudarstvennaiia Teleradiokompaniia] was created in 1998 by the
decree, 0 Formirovanii Edinogo Proizvodstvenno-Tekhnologiceskogo Kompleksa Gosudarstvennykh
Sredstv Massovoi Informatsii ot 27 lulia 1998 No. 844 [On the Formation of a Unitary Technological
Infrastructure for the State Mass Media], July 27, 1998. VGTRK controlled programming and transmission
for state owned television and leased many of its transmission facilities to commercial entities such as
privately operated regional television stations. Alexander Latkin and Grigorii Punanov, Remember the
Fire, IZVESTUA, Aug. 15, 2001.
9 Siberian Federal District Establishes Own TV Company, EIM MEDIA REPORT FROM THE CIS, at
http://www.intemews.ru/eim/july200l/rue.htmil (July 2001).
92 EIM MEDIA REPORT FROM THE CIS, at http://www.intemews.ru/eim/july200l/rue.html (July
2001). "Correcting discontinuities" is one variant of an array of euphemisms employed by government
press agencies that effectively mean one thing: to centralize control over regional broadcasters to ensure
that their programming corresponds to Kremlin policy.
93 The president of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Murtaza Rakhimov, has always had a strained
relationship with Moscow. In 1999, the Media Ministry expressed its disapproval of the Bashkortostan
State Assembly's decision to suspend the broadcasts of programs of Sergei Dorenko and Nikolai Svanidze
on its local television. (They were both anchors of controversial news programs on the state channels ORT
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however, after a great deal of pressure from Moscow, Republic authorities
agreed to have the station incorporated into the federally controlled
VGTRK.94 Controversy over control of regional broadcasting erupted in the
nearby Republic of Udmurtia, as well. VGTRK had named Vera Kadyrova
as new director for the Udmurtia branch in lzhevsk. The old director,
however, refused to relinquish his position, and was supported by the
regional legislature. A compromise was eventually reached by having a
temporary director assigned to this position until the Izhevsk mayoral
elections, 95 when Kadyrova would be named as the new director. 96 These
examples demonstrate the intense struggle between Moscow and the regions
for ultimate sovereignty over the means of knowledge production and the
capacity to exercise their discursive power.
Perhaps the most important change in the regulation of broadcast
networks in Russia arose from an August 2001 presidential decree.
Vladimir Putin ordered a reorganization of VGTRK , creating a new state
owned Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network ("RTRS") to be
in charge of maintaining transmission facilities for both state and private
broadcasters.9 7 VGTRK had needed substantial investment just to sustain its
infrastructure, and there had been talk about privatizing it to attract
investment, but this idea was abandoned in favor of de facto
nationalization. 98 The provision prohibiting the privatization of transmission
facilities was instituted in order to halt the regional broadcasters' practice of
lending equipment and licenses to private companies, which had become a
relatively common method of obtaining much-needed capital. The decree
empowered the federal government to void such agreements, effectively
bringing the entire television broadcast infrastructure under state control.
and RTR, respectively.) Moscow Angered by Region's Ban on Central TV, COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN
TRANSITION NEWSLETrER, at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/transitionI/issue03/russia.htm (Dec. 22, 1999).
Rakhimov, like many other regional leaders, exercised his own localized version of information
sovereignty, amounting to a local form of censorship equally as stifling as Moscow's. M. Steven Fish
observes that "[miany regional officials, taking their cue from the center, have tightened control over the
media in their bailiwicks." Fish, supra note 4.
94 Gul'chachak, Khannanova, Bashkirskoe Televidenie Vernetsia v Rossiiu [Bashkir State Television
Returns to Russia], KOMMERS, May 28, 2001.
95 This is one example of the value regional elected officials put on having a good "relationship"
with their local broadcasting stations. Television and radio are consistently exploited in election campaigns
by incumbents and others with political power.
96 Battle for Udmurt Television Ends?, RFE/R.L NEWSLINE (Nov. 6, 2001), at http://www.rferl.org/
newsline/2001/11/061101.asp.
9' Andrei Zolotov Jr., President Approves VGTRK Overhaul, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, in
LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times File.
98 Id.
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The prominent writer and political activist Yevgenia Albats, writing
about the RGTRK in her last column as a journalist in Russia, compared
Putin's centralization of control over the electronic media with Gosteleradio,
the state monopoly that controlled all national networks and broadcasting
facilities in the Soviet era.99 The eighty-nine different subjects of the
Russian Federation, having been subsumed under Putin's seven federal
administrative districts, have found that Moscow's relationship with local
government will not be subject solely to bureaucratic centralization. The
centralization of authority will be exercised in the cultural sphere as well,
with the Kremlin as the single voice on the airwaves from Moscow to the
Far East.
V. CONCLUSION
The anticipated surge of restrictive amendments to the Mass Media
Law °00 in line with the new Doctrine did not materialize,' 0' but the textual
representation of identity, values, and threat propagated by the Kremlin
seems to correspond to a distinctive trend in the relationship between the
99 Yevgenia Albats, No Longer Fitting into the Picture, MOSCOW TIMES, Aug, 28, 2001, in LEXIS,
News Library, Moscow Times File. Explaining why she cannot bring herself to work for the Moscow
Times any longer, she laments, "I need to take a break now in order to distance myself from the everyday
of Russian politics, to think about what happened and why. I need to think about what happened to people
like me, people who 10 years ago were willing to lay down their lives for democracy. I need to think about
what happened to Russian journalism, to which I no longer belong." Id.
10o Some objectionable amendments have been passed, though not nearly as many as feared. For
example, on the eve of UN's Intemational Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, an amendment
was adopted to the law on news media prohibiting certain drug-related information to be published. Marina
Latysheva, Ne Slova o Narkotikakh [Not a Word About Drugs], SEGODNIA, June 26, 2000, at 1-2.
Journalists are still permitted to write about drug-related issues in general, but they are prohibited from
writing about where drugs are distributed, making it impossible, for example, for the media to report where
and under what circumstances drug dealers are arrested. Id. Another likely consequence of this
amendment is that journalists could not write about various medical programs for drug addicts designed to
inhibit the spread of HIV. Id. A number of laws proposed for discussion and bills submitted to the Duma
that never made it through the legislature are worth noting, as many analysts contend that they were
designed to measure public response towards very restrictive legislation. A few notable examples include
the following proposed amendments to the Mass Media Law of 1991: changes in the text of a section that
prohibits open calls for riots to language that implies instigation of riots, removal of an article establishing
the status of journalists and granting them the rights to protect their sources and to have access to areas
closed to civilians. Valeria Korchagina, Proposed Media Law Restricts Reporters, MOSCOW TIMES, Jan.
30, 2001, in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times File. Another proposed amendment was to ban the use
of the media for the purpose of "defiling or being disrespectful" towards the state flag, coat of arms,
anthem, or other symbols. Svetlana Korkina, Bill Seeks to Protect Anthem, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001,
in LEXIS, News Library, Moscow Times File.
1o1 There are those, though, that continue to press for changes in the Mass Media Law. State Duma
representative Konstantin Vetrov asserts that the current law is "outdated," because there is a "different
understanding of freedom of speech" now than ten years ago. Dmitry Chemov, Forgotten New Law,
VREMYA MN, Jan. 29, 2002, at 3.
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state and its citizens as mediated by television. Despite the popular
sentiment that freedom of information is a fundamental right, opponents of
the Kremlin's treatment of the press do not enjoy a great deal of popular
support. The indifference of the general public to the plight of the major
television channels that were subsumed under the state can be explained by
the lack of credibility of their owners. 0 2 Some also attribute this attitude to
the historical/cultural precedent that leads both journalists and the public to
assume the subjectivity of the press.'0 3
Capitalizing on the public's low opinion of the integrity of the
independent media, and asserting administrative control over the national
television networks, the Kremlin has virtually monopolized the instruments
of truth production. The dominant presence of the state in the media
landscape has arguably already had a significant effect on public
consciousness already. For example, Yuri Levada observes a remarkable
discrepancy between Putin's approval ratings and evaluations of his
performance according to specific criteria or actions in particular
situations. 104 His approval rating has consistently remained at about 70%.105
Month after month, however, evaluations of his achievements and directed
questions about significant events are comparatively bleak. Examples from
2000 include: 50% of the respondents felt that he has been unable to
establish order in the country, 63% did not recognize any improvement in
the economy and people's well being, and 71% saw no possibility resolving
the conflict in Chechnya.10 6 Levada suggests that Putin's consistently high
general approval rating can be associated with "hopes for the future," but
this seems to be an unsatisfactory conclusion. It is more likely that the
discrepancies in the ratings can be attributed to the dramatic success of the
Kremlin's appropriation of the airwaves.
102 This is mainly because the only privately owned television networks with national reach were
controlled by "oligarchs," whom most Russians considered opportunists and crooks. Floriana Fossato, The
Russian Media: From Polarity to Distrust, 307 CURRENT HISTORY 344 (2001). Some argue that this
distrust is a result of a perceived bias towards the interests of network owners and the politicians with
whom they are connected. Id.
103 Id. According to Iosif Dzialoshinskii, a Moscow University journalism professor, "in most
Western countries, news media developed in parallel with a trading class willing to make decisions based
on information. Historically, this was not the case in Russia. 'The press in Russia developed, from the
beginning, among thinkers. They were writers, they were opposition activists, or . . . they were people
close to the government. These people started publishing newspapers, writing in newspapers, not because
they wanted to disseminate information, but because they wanted to influence the situation. [Since then,] a
journalist in Russia cannot simply act as an informer. It is an accepted fact that a journalist [is somebody
who] must teach how to live." Id.
:04 Levada, supra note 14.
05 Id.
106 Id.
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There is little sign that the pervasive voice of the state will be
challenged in the near future, as the broadcast industry is consistently
subjected to "administrative harassment" and centralization of technical and
editorial control.10 7 If executive power goes unchecked, and there are no
state or public institutions in place through which the public can express its
discontent, this trend may bring about serious, destabilizing conflict in the
public and private spheres. Recent Soviet history can attest to the imperative
of free speech for peaceful transformation. The policy of glasnost, though
some blame it for the demise of the U.S.S.R., was surely a significant factor
in the relatively peaceful collapse of an empire. Stifled by a "protective"
government exerting its power to secure state-sanctioned information and
contain authentic meaning and identity, Russia could very well endure more
profound disturbances in its social fabric than heretofore expected. Like
Kafka's creature in "The Burrow," which digs an intricate labyrinth of
underground tunnels to escape the beasts it imagines lurk outside, but in the
end cannot tell the difference between the noises outside and the noises
created by its own digging, the nation could become disoriented and go
astray of the path to democracy and the realization of a civil society.
108
107 Putin has brought all of Russia's national television stations under state control, and "if current
trends hold, criticism of the president in the electronic media may become as scarce as it is in full-blown
autocracies like Belarus and Kazakhstan." Fish, supra note 4.
108 SHAPtRO, supra note 37, at 124.
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